

Lecture 3

Hindsight rationality and regret minimization

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With this class we begin to explore what it means to “learn” from repeated play in a game, and how that “learning”, which is intrinsically a *dynamic* concept, relates to the much more *static* concept of game-theoretic equilibria.

1 Hindsight rationality and Φ -regret

What does it mean to “learn” in games? The answer to this question is delicate. The history of learning in games historically spanned several subfields. A powerful definition for what “learning in games” means is through the concept of *hindsight rationality*.

Take the point of view of one player in a game, and let \mathcal{X} be their set of available strategies. At each time $t = 1, 2, \dots$, the player will play some strategy $\mathbf{x}^t \in \mathcal{X}$, receive some form of feedback (for example, the gradient of the player’s utility, or maybe just the utility itself), and will incorporate that feedback to formulate a “better” strategy $\mathbf{x}^{t+1} \in \mathcal{X}$ for the next repetition of the game.

Now suppose that the game is played infinite times, and looking back at what was played by the player we realize that every single time the player played a certain strategy \mathbf{a} , they would have been strictly better by consistently playing different strategy \mathbf{b} instead. Can we really say that the player has “learnt” how to play? Perhaps not.

That leads to the idea of *hindsight rationality*: the player has “learnt” to play the game when looking back at the history of play, they cannot think of any transformation $\phi : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ of their strategies that when applied at the whole history of play would have given strictly better utility to the player.

This leads to the following definition.

Definition 1.1 (Φ -regret minimizer). Given a set \mathcal{X} of points and a set Φ of linear transformations $\phi : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$, a Φ -regret minimizer for the set \mathcal{X} is a model for a decision maker that repeatedly interacts with a black-box environment. At each time t , the regret minimizer interacts with the environment through two operations:

- NEXTSTRATEGY has the effect that the regret minimizer will output an element $\mathbf{x}^t \in \mathcal{X}$;
- OBSERVEUTILITY(ℓ^t) provides the environment’s feedback to the regret minimizer, in the form of a linear utility function $\ell^t : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ that evaluates how good the last-output point \mathbf{x}^t was. The utility function can depend adversarially on the outputs $\mathbf{x}^1, \dots, \mathbf{x}^t$ if the regret minimizer is deterministic (i.e., does not use randomness internally^a).

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Its quality metric is its cumulative Φ -regret, defined as the quantity

$$R_{\Phi}^T := \max_{\hat{\phi} \in \Phi} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \left(\ell^t(\hat{\phi}(\mathbf{x}^t)) - \ell^t(\mathbf{x}^t) \right) \right\}, \quad (1)$$

The goal for a Φ -regret minimizer is to guarantee that its Φ -regret grows asymptotically sublinearly as time T increases.

^aWhen randomness is involved, the utility function cannot depend adversarially on \mathbf{x}^t or guaranteeing sublinear regret would be impossible. Rather, ℓ^t must be conditionally independent on \mathbf{x}^t , given all past random outcomes.

Calls to NEXTSTRATEGY and OBSERVEUTILITY keep alternating to each other: first, the regret minimizer will output a point \mathbf{x}^1 , then it will receive feedback ℓ^1 from the environment, then it will output a new point \mathbf{x}^2 , and so on. The decision making encoded by the regret minimizer is *online*, in the sense that at each time t , the output of the regret minimizer can depend on the prior outputs $\mathbf{x}^1, \dots, \mathbf{x}^{t-1}$ and corresponding observed utility functions $\ell^1, \dots, \ell^{t-1}$, but no information about future utilities is available.

1.1 Some notable choices for the set of transformations Φ considered

The size of the set of transformations Φ considered by the player defines a natural notion of how “rational” the agent is. There are several choices of interest for Φ .

1. $\Phi =$ set of *all* mappings from \mathcal{X} to \mathcal{X} . This is the maximum level of hindsight rationality. The corresponding notion of Φ -regret in this case is known as *swap regret*.
2. $\Phi =$ set of all “single-point deviations” on \mathcal{X} , defined as

$$\Phi = \{ \phi_{\mathbf{a} \rightarrow \mathbf{b}} \}_{\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathcal{X}}, \quad \text{where } \phi_{\mathbf{a} \rightarrow \mathbf{b}} : \mathbf{x} \mapsto \begin{cases} \mathbf{x} & \text{if } \mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{a} \\ \mathbf{b} & \text{if } \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{a}. \end{cases}$$

This is known as *internal regret*.

Fact 1.1. When all agents in a multiplayer general-sum game (normal-form or extensive-form) play so that their internal or swap regret grows sublinearly, their empirical frequency of play converges to a *correlated equilibrium* of the game.

3. $\Phi =$ a particular set of linear transformations called *trigger deviation functions*. It is known that in this case the Φ -regret can be efficiently bounded with a polynomial dependence on the size of the game tree. The reason why this choice of deviation functions is important is given by the following fact.

Fact 1.2. When all agents in a multiplayer general-sum extensive-form game play so that their Φ -regret relative to trigger deviation functions grows sublinearly, their empirical frequency of play converges to an *extensive-form correlated equilibrium* of the game.

4. $\Phi =$ constant transformations. In this case, we are only requiring that the player not regret substituting *all* of the strategies they played with the *same* strategy \mathbf{a} . While this seems like an extremely restricted notion of rationality, it actually turns out to be already extremely powerful. We will spend the rest of this class to see why.

Fact 1.3. When all agents in a multiplayer general-sum game (normal-form or extensive-form) play so that their external regret grows sublinearly, their empirical frequency of play converges to a *coarse correlated equilibrium* of the game.

Fact 1.4. When all agents in a two-player zero-sum game (normal-form or extensive-form) play so that their external regret grows sublinearly, their average strategies converge to a *Nash equilibrium* of the game.

1.2 A very important special case: regret minimization

The special case where Φ is chosen to be the set of constant transformations only is so important that it warrants its own special definition and notation.

Definition 1.2 (Regret minimizer). Let \mathcal{X} be a set. An *external regret minimizer for \mathcal{X}* —or simply “*regret minimizer for \mathcal{X}* ”—is a Φ^{const} -regret minimizer for the special set of *constant* transformations

$$\Phi^{\text{const}} := \{\phi_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}} : \mathbf{x} \mapsto \hat{\mathbf{x}}\}_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}}.$$

Its corresponding Φ^{const} -regret is called “*external regret*” or simply “*regret*”, and it is indicated with the symbol

$$R^T := \max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T (\ell^t(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) - \ell^t(\mathbf{x}^t)) \right\}. \quad (2)$$

Once again, the goal for a regret minimizer is to have its cumulative regret R^T grow sublinearly in T .

An important result in the subfield of *online linear optimization* asserts the existence of algorithms that guarantee sublinear regret for any convex and compact domain \mathcal{X} , typically of the order $R^T = O(\sqrt{T})$ asymptotically.

As it turns out, external regret minimization alone is enough to guarantee convergence to Nash equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games, to coarse correlated equilibrium in multiplayer general-sum games, to best responses to static stochastic opponents in multiplayer general-sum games, and much more. Before we delve into those aspects, however, we first show another important property of regret minimization: general Φ -regret minimization can be reduced to it, in a precise sense.

1.3 From regret minimization to Φ -regret minimization

As we have seen, regret minimization is a very narrow instantiation of Φ -regret minimization—perhaps the smallest sensible instantiation. Then, clearly, the problem of coming up with a regret minimizer for a set \mathcal{X} cannot be harder than the problem of coming up with a Φ -regret minimizer for \mathcal{X} for richer sets of transformation functions Φ . It might then seem surprising that there exists a construction that reduces Φ -regret minimization to regret minimization.

More precisely, a result by [Gordon et al. \[2008\]](#) gives a way to construct a Φ -regret minimizer for \mathcal{X} starting from any regret minimizer *for the set of functions Φ* . The result goes as follows.

Theorem 1.1 ([Gordon et al. \[2008\]](#)). Let \mathcal{R} be a deterministic regret minimizer for the set of transformations Φ whose (external) cumulative regret R^T grows sublinearly in T , and assume that every $\phi \in \Phi$ admits a fixed point $\phi(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}$. Then, a Φ -regret minimizer \mathcal{R}_{Φ} can be constructed starting from \mathcal{R} as follows:

- Each call to $\mathcal{R}_\Phi.\text{NEXTSTRATEGY}$ first calls NEXTSTRATEGY on \mathcal{R} to obtain the next transformation ϕ^t . Then, a fixed point $\mathbf{x}^t = \phi^t(\mathbf{x}^t)$ is computed and output.
- Each call to $\mathcal{R}_\Phi.\text{OBSERVEUTILITY}(\ell^t)$ with linear utility function ℓ^t constructs the linear utility function $L^t : \phi \mapsto \ell^t(\phi(\mathbf{x}^t))$, where \mathbf{x}^t is the last-output strategy, and passes it to \mathcal{R} by calling $\mathcal{R}.\text{OBSERVEUTILITY}(L^t)$.^b

Furthermore, the Φ -regret R_Φ^T cumulated up to time T by \mathcal{R}_Φ we have just defined is exactly equal to the (external) cumulative regret R^T cumulated by \mathcal{R} :

$$R_\Phi^T = R^T \quad \forall T = 1, 2, \dots$$

So, because the regret cumulated by \mathcal{R} grows sublinearly by hypothesis, then so does the Φ -regret cumulated by \mathcal{R}_Φ .

^bOn the surface, it might look like L^t is independent on the last output ϕ^t of the regret minimizer \mathcal{R} , and thus, that it trivially satisfies the requirements of Definition 1.2. However, that is not true: \mathbf{x}^t is a fixed point of ϕ^t , and since \mathbf{x}^t enters into the definition of L^t , if \mathcal{R} picks ϕ^t randomly, it might very well be that L^t is not conditionally independent on ϕ^t . We sidestep this issue by requiring that \mathcal{R} is deterministic (cf. Footnote a).

Proof. The proof of correctness of the above construction is deceptively simple. Since \mathcal{R} outputs transformations $\phi^1, \phi^2, \dots \in \Phi$ and receives utilities $\phi \mapsto \ell^1(\phi(\mathbf{x}^1)), \phi \mapsto \ell^2(\phi(\mathbf{x}^2)), \dots$, its cumulative regret R^T is by definition

$$R^T = \max_{\hat{\phi} \in \Phi} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \left(\ell^t(\hat{\phi}(\mathbf{x}^t)) - \ell^t(\phi^t(\mathbf{x}^t)) \right) \right\}.$$

Now, since by construction \mathbf{x}^t is a fixed point of ϕ^t , $\phi^t(\mathbf{x}^t) = \mathbf{x}^t$, and therefore we can write

$$R^T = \max_{\hat{\phi} \in \Phi} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \left(\ell^t(\hat{\phi}(\mathbf{x}^t)) - \ell^t(\mathbf{x}^t) \right) \right\}, \quad (3)$$

where the right-hand side is exactly the cumulative Φ -regret R_Φ^T incurred by \mathcal{R}_Φ , as defined in (2). \square

2 Applications of regret minimization

In order to establish regret minimization as a meaningful abstraction for learning in games, we must check that regret minimizing and Φ -regret minimizing dynamics indeed lead to “interesting” or expected behavior in common situations.

2.1 Learning a best response against stochastic opponents

As a first smoke test, let’s verify that over time a regret minimizer would learn how to best respond to static, stochastic opponents. Specifically, consider this scenario. We are playing a repeated n -player general-sum game with multilinear utilities (this captures normal-form game and extensive-form games alike), where Players $i = 1, \dots, n-1$ play stochastically, that is, at each t they independently sample a strategy $\mathbf{x}^{(i),t} \in \mathcal{X}^{(i)}$ from the same fixed distribution (which is unknown to any other player). Formally, this means that

$$\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{x}^{(i),t}] = \bar{\mathbf{x}}^{(i)} \quad \forall i = 1, \dots, n-1, \quad t = 1, 2, \dots$$

Player n , on the other hand, is learning in the game, picking strategies according to some algorithm that guarantees sublinear external regret, where the feedback observed by Player n at each time t is their own linear utility function:

$$\ell^t := \mathcal{X}^{(n)} \ni \mathbf{x}^{(n)} \mapsto u^{(n)}(\mathbf{x}^{(1),t}, \dots, \mathbf{x}^{(n-1),t}, \mathbf{x}^{(n)}).$$

Then, the average of the strategies played by Player n converges almost surely to a best response to $\bar{\mathbf{x}}^{(1)}, \dots, \bar{\mathbf{x}}^{(n-1)}$, that is,

$$\frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \mathbf{x}^{(n),t} \xrightarrow{\text{a.s.}} \arg \max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}}^{(n)} \in \mathcal{X}^{(n)}} \left\{ u^{(n)}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}^{(1)}, \dots, \bar{\mathbf{x}}^{(n-1)}, \hat{\mathbf{x}}^{(n)}) \right\}.$$

(You should try to prove this!)

2.2 Self-play convergence to bilinear saddle points (such as a Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum game)

It turns out that regret minimization can be used to converge to bilinear saddle points, that is solutions to problems of the form

$$\max_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \min_{\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{Y}} \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y}, \quad (4)$$

where \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are convex compact sets and \mathbf{A} is a matrix. These types of optimization problems are pervasive in game-theory. The canonical prototype of bilinear saddle point problem is the computation of Nash equilibria in two-player zero-sum games (either normal-form or extensive-form). There, a Nash equilibrium is the solution to (4) where \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} are the strategy spaces of Player 1 and Player 2 respectively (probability simplexes for normal-form games or sequence-form polytopes for extensive-form games), and \mathbf{A} is the payoff matrix for Player 1. Other examples include social-welfare-maximizing correlated equilibria and optimal strategies in two-team zero-sum adversarial team games.

The idea behind using regret minimization to converge to bilinear saddle-point problems is to use *self play*. We instantiate two regret minimization algorithms, $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{Y}$, for the domains of the maximization and minimization problem, respectively. At each time t the two regret minimizers output strategies \mathbf{x}^t and \mathbf{y}^t , respectively. Then, they receive feedback $\ell_\mathcal{X}^t, \ell_\mathcal{Y}^t$ defined as

$$\ell_\mathcal{X}^t : \mathbf{x} \mapsto (\mathbf{A} \mathbf{y}^t)^\top \mathbf{x}, \quad \ell_\mathcal{Y}^t : \mathbf{y} \mapsto -(\mathbf{A}^\top \mathbf{x}^t)^\top \mathbf{y}.$$

We summarize the process pictorially in Figure 1.




Figure 1: The flow of strategies and utilities in regret minimization for games. The symbol \square denotes computation/construction of the utility function.

A well known folk theorem establish that the pair of average strategies produced by the regret minimizers up to any time T converges to a saddle point of (4), where convergence is measured via the *saddle point gap*

$$0 \leq \gamma(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) := \left(\max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \{\hat{\mathbf{x}}^\top \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y}\} - \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y} \right) + \left(\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y} - \min_{\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in \mathcal{Y}} \{\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} \hat{\mathbf{y}}\} \right) = \max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \{\hat{\mathbf{x}}^\top \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y}\} - \min_{\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in \mathcal{Y}} \{\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{A} \hat{\mathbf{y}}\}.$$

A point $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ has zero saddle point gap if and only if it is a solution to (4).

Theorem 2.1. Consider the self-play setup summarized in Figure 1, where $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{Y}$ are regret minimizers for the sets \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} , respectively. Let $R_\mathcal{X}^T$ and $R_\mathcal{Y}^T$ be the (sublinear) regret cumulated by $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{X}$ and $\mathcal{R}_\mathcal{Y}$, respectively, up to time T , and let $\bar{\mathbf{x}}^T$ and $\bar{\mathbf{y}}^T$ denote the average of the strategies

produced up to time T . Then, the saddle point gap $\gamma(\bar{\mathbf{x}}^T, \bar{\mathbf{y}}^T)$ of $(\bar{\mathbf{x}}^T, \bar{\mathbf{y}}^T)$ satisfies

$$\gamma(\bar{\mathbf{x}}^T, \bar{\mathbf{y}}^T) \leq \frac{R_{\mathcal{X}}^T + R_{\mathcal{Y}}^T}{T} \rightarrow 0 \quad \text{as } T \rightarrow \infty.$$

Proof. By definition of regret,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{R_{\mathcal{X}}^T + R_{\mathcal{Y}}^T}{T} &= \frac{1}{T} \max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_{\mathcal{X}}^t(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) \right\} - \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_{\mathcal{X}}^t(\mathbf{x}^t) + \frac{1}{T} \max_{\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in \mathcal{Y}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_{\mathcal{Y}}^t(\hat{\mathbf{y}}) \right\} - \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_{\mathcal{Y}}^t(\mathbf{y}^t) \\ &= \frac{1}{T} \max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_{\mathcal{X}}^t(\hat{\mathbf{x}}) \right\} + \frac{1}{T} \max_{\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in \mathcal{Y}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \ell_{\mathcal{Y}}^t(\hat{\mathbf{y}}) \right\} \quad (\text{since } \ell_{\mathcal{X}}^t(\mathbf{x}^t) + \ell_{\mathcal{Y}}^t(\mathbf{y}^t) = 0) \\ &= \frac{1}{T} \max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T \hat{\mathbf{x}}^\top \mathbf{A} \mathbf{y}^t \right\} + \frac{1}{T} \max_{\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in \mathcal{Y}} \left\{ \sum_{t=1}^T -(\mathbf{x}^t)^\top \mathbf{A} \hat{\mathbf{y}} \right\} \\ &= \max_{\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathcal{X}} \{ \hat{\mathbf{x}}^\top \mathbf{A} \bar{\mathbf{y}}^T \} - \min_{\hat{\mathbf{y}} \in \mathcal{Y}} \{ (\bar{\mathbf{x}}^T)^\top \mathbf{A} \hat{\mathbf{y}} \} = \gamma(\bar{\mathbf{x}}^T, \bar{\mathbf{y}}^T). \end{aligned}$$

□

References

Geoffrey J Gordon, Amy Greenwald, and Casey Marks. No-regret learning in convex games. In *Proceedings of the International Conference on Machine Learning (ICML)*, pages 360–367. ACM, 2008.