
Ex ante coordination and collusion in zero-sum multi-player extensive-form games

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Abstract

Recent milestones in equilibrium computation, such as the success of *Libratus*, show that it is possible to compute strong solutions to two-player zero-sum games in theory and practice. This is not the case for games with more than two players, which remain one of the main open challenges in computational game theory. This paper focuses on zero-sum games where a team of players faces an opponent, as is the case, for example, in Bridge, collusion in poker, and many non-recreational applications such as war, where the colluders do not have time or means of communicating during battle, collusion in bidding, where communication during the auction is illegal, and coordinated swindling in public. The possibility for the team members to communicate before game play—that is, coordinate their strategies *ex ante*—makes the use of behavioral strategies unsatisfactory. The reasons for this are closely related to the fact that the team can be represented as a single player with imperfect recall. We propose a new game representation, the *realization form*, that generalizes the *sequence form* but can also be applied to imperfect-recall games. Then, we use it to derive an *auxiliary game* that is equivalent to the original one. It provides a sound way to map the problem of finding an optimal ex-ante-coordinated strategy for the team to the well-understood Nash equilibrium-finding problem in a (larger) two-player zero-sum perfect-recall game. By reasoning over the auxiliary game, we devise an anytime algorithm, *fictitious team-play*, that is guaranteed to converge to an optimal coordinated strategy for the team against an optimal opponent, and that is dramatically faster than the prior state-of-the-art algorithm for this problem.

1 Introduction

In recent years, computational studies on imperfect-information games have largely focused on two-player zero-sum games. In that setting, AI techniques have achieved remarkable results, such as defeating top human specialist professionals in heads-up no-limit Texas hold'em poker [4, 5].

Fewer results are known for settings with more than two players. Yet, many strategic interactions provide players with incentives to team up. In some cases, players may have a similar goal and may be willing to coordinate and share their final reward. Consider, as an illustration, the case of a poker

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game with three or more players, where all but one of them collude against an identified target player and will share the winnings after the game. In other settings, players might be forced to cooperate by the nature of the interaction itself. This is the case, for instance, in the card-playing phase of Bridge, where a team of two players, called the “defenders”, plays against a third player, the “declarer”. Situations of a team ganging up on a player are, of course, ubiquitous in many non-recreational applications as well, such as war where the colluders do not have time or means of communicating during battle, collusion in bidding where communication during the auction is illegal, coordinated swindling in public, and so on.

The benefits from coordination/collusion depend on the communication possibilities among team members. In this paper, we are interested in *ex ante coordination*, where the team members have an opportunity to discuss and agree on tactics before the game starts, but will be unable to communicate during the game, except through their publicly-observed actions.² The team faces an opponent in a zero-sum game (as in, for example, multi-player poker with collusion and Bridge).

Even without communication *during* the game, the planning phase gives the team members an advantage: for instance, the team members could skew their strategies to use certain actions to signal about their state (for example, that they have particular cards). In other words, by having agreed on each member’s planned reaction under any possible circumstance of the game, information can be silently propagated in the clear, by simply observing public information.

Ex ante coordination can enable the team members to obtain significantly higher utility (up to a factor linear in the number of the game-tree leaves) than the utility they would obtain by abstaining from coordination [1, 6, 25]. Finding an equilibrium with *ex ante* coordination is NP-hard and inapproximable [1, 6]. The only known algorithm is based on a hybrid representation of the game, where team members play joint normal-form actions while the adversary employs sequence-form strategies [6]. We will develop dramatically faster algorithms in this paper.

A team that *ex ante* coordinates can be modeled as a single meta-player. This meta-player typically has imperfect recall, given that the team members observe different aspects of the play (opponent’s moves, each others’ moves, and chance’s moves) and cannot communicate during the game. Then, solving the game amounts to computing a *Nash equilibrium (NE)* in normal-form strategies in a two-player zero-sum imperfect-recall game. The focus on normal-form strategies is crucial. Indeed, it is known that behavioral strategies, that provide a compact representation of the players’ strategies, cannot be employed in imperfect-recall games without incurring a loss of expressiveness [18]. Some imperfect-recall games do not even have any NE in behavioral strategies [27]. Even when a NE in behavioral strategies exists, its value can be up to a linear factor (in the number of the game-tree leaves) worse than that of a NE in normal-form strategies. For these reasons, recent efficient techniques for approximating maxmin behavioral strategy profiles in imperfect-recall games [9, 7] are not applicable to our domain.

Main contributions of this paper. Our first contribution is a new game representation, which we call the *realization form*. In perfect-recall games it essentially coincides with the sequence form, but, unlike the sequence form, it can also be used in imperfect-recall games. By exploiting the realization form, we produce a two-player *auxiliary game* that has perfect recall, and is equivalent to the normal form of the original game, but significantly more concise. Furthermore, we propose an anytime algorithm, *fictitious team-play*, which is a variation of fictitious play [2]. It is guaranteed to converge to an optimal solution in the setting where the team members coordinate *ex ante*. Experiments show that it is dramatically faster than the prior state-of-the-art algorithm for this problem.

2 Preliminaries

In this section we provide a brief overview of extensive-form games (see also the textbook by Shoham and Leyton-Brown [20]). An extensive-form game Γ has a finite set \mathcal{P} of players and a finite set of actions A . H is the set of all possible nodes, described as sequences of actions (histories). $A(h)$ is the set of actions available at node h . If $a \in A(h)$ leads to h' , we write $ha = h'$.

²This kind of coordination has sometimes been referred to as *ex ante correlation* among team members [6]. However, we will not use that term because this setting is quite different than the usual notion of correlation in game theory. In the usual correlation setting, the individual players have to be incentivized to follow the recommendations of the correlation device. In contrast, here there is no need for such incentives because the members of the team can share the benefits from coordination.

$P(h) \in \mathcal{P} \cup \{c\}$ is the player who acts at h , where c denotes chance. H_i is the set of decision nodes where player i acts. Z is the set of terminal nodes. For each player $i \in P$, there is a payoff function $u_i : Z \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. An extensive-form game with imperfect information has a set \mathcal{I} of information sets. Decision nodes within the same information set are not distinguishable for the player whose turn it is to move. By definition, for any $I \in \mathcal{I}$, $A(I) = A(h)$, for all $h \in I$. \mathcal{I}_i is the information partition of H_i .

A *pure normal-form plan* for player i is a tuple $\sigma \in \Sigma_i = \times_{I \in \mathcal{I}_i} A(I)$ that specifies an action for each information set of that player. $\sigma(I)$ denotes the action selected in σ at information set I . A *normal-form strategy* x_i for player i is defined as $x_i : \Sigma_i \rightarrow \Delta^{|\Sigma_i|}$. We denote by \mathcal{X}_i the normal-form strategy space of player i . A *behavioral strategy* $\pi_i \in \Pi_i$ associates each $I \in \mathcal{I}_i$ with a probability vector over $A(I)$. $\pi_i(I, a)$ denotes the probability with which i chooses action a at I . π_c is the strategy of a virtual player, “chance”, who plays non-strategically and is used to represent exogenous stochasticity. The expected payoff of player i , when she plays x_i and the opponents play x_{-i} , is denoted, with an overload of notation, by $u_i(x_i, x_{-i})$.

Denote by $\rho_i^{x_i}(z)$ the probability with which player i plays to reach z when following strategy x_i ($\rho_i^{\pi_i}(z)$ is defined analogously). Then, $\rho^x(z) = \prod_{i \in P \cup \{c\}} \rho_i^{x_i}(z)$ is the probability of reaching z when players follow behavioral strategy profile x . We say that x_i, x'_i are *realization equivalent* if, for any x_{-i} and for any $z \in Z$, $\rho^x(z) = \rho^{x'}(z)$, where $x = (x_i, x_{-i})$, $x' = (x'_i, x_{-i})$. The same definition holds for strategies in different representations (e.g., behavioral and sequence form). Similarly, two strategies x_i, x'_i are *payoff equivalent* if, $\forall j \in P$ and $\forall x_{-i}, u_j(x_i, x_{-i}) = u_j(x'_i, x_{-i})$.

A player has *perfect recall* if she has perfect memory of her past actions and observations. Formally, $\forall x_i, \forall I \in \mathcal{I}_i, \forall h, h' \in I, \rho_i^{x_i}(h) = \rho_i^{x_i}(h')$. Γ has perfect recall if every player has perfect recall.

$\text{BR}(x_{-i})$ denotes the *best response* of player i against a strategy profile x_{-i} . A best response is a strategy such that $u_i(\text{BR}(x_{-i}), x_{-i}) = \max_{x_i \in \mathcal{X}_i} u_i(x_i, x_{-i})$. A NE [17] is a strategy profile in which no player can improve her utility by unilaterally deviating from her strategy. Therefore, for each player i , a NE $x^* = (x_i^*, x_{-i}^*)$ satisfies $u_i(x_i^*, x_{-i}^*) = u_i(\text{BR}(x_{-i}^*), x_{-i}^*)$.

The sequence form [12, 23] of a game is a compact representation applicable only to games with perfect recall. It decomposes strategies into sequences of actions and their realization probabilities. A sequence $q_i \in Q_i$ for player i , defined by a node h , is a tuple specifying player i 's actions on the path from the root to h . A sequence is said terminal if, together with some sequences of the other players, leads to a terminal node. q_\emptyset denotes the fictitious sequence leading to the root node and qa is the extended sequence obtained by appending action a to q . A *sequence-form strategy* for player i is a function $r_i : Q_i \rightarrow [0, 1]$, s.t. $r_i(q_\emptyset) = 1$ and, for each $I \in \mathcal{I}_i$ and sequence q leading to I , $-r_i(q) + \sum_{a \in A(I)} r_i(qa) = 0$.

3 Team-maxmin equilibrium with coordination device (TMECor)

In the setting of *ex ante coordination*, team members have the opportunity to discuss tactics before the game begins, but are otherwise unable to communicate during the game, except via publicly-observed actions. A powerful, game-theoretic way to think about *ex ante* coordination is through a *coordination device*. In the planning phase before the game starts, the team members identify a set of joint pure normal-form plans. Then, just before the play, the coordination device will randomly draw one of the normal-form plans from a given probability distribution, and the team members will all act as specified in the selected plan. A NE where team members play *ex ante* coordinated normal-form strategies is called a *team-maxmin equilibrium with coordination device* (TMECor) [6].³ In an approximate version, ϵ -TMECor, neither the team nor the opponent can gain more than ϵ by deviating from their strategy, assuming that the other does not deviate.

By sampling a recommendation from a joint probability distribution over Σ_1, Σ_2 , the coordination device introduces a correlation between the strategies of the team members that is otherwise impossible to capture using behavioral strategies. In other words, in general there exists no behavioral strategy for the team player that is realization-equivalent to the normal-form strategy induced by the coordination device, as the following example further illustrates.

³They actually called it correlation, not coordination. As explained in the introduction, we will use the term coordination. However, we will keep their acronym TMECor instead of switching to the acronym TMECoor.

Example 1. Consider the zero-sum game in Figure 1. Two team members (Players 1 and 2) play against an adversary \mathcal{A} . The team obtains a cumulative payoff of 2 when the game ends at ① or ⑧, and a payoff of 0 otherwise. A valid ex ante coordination device is as follows: the team members toss an unbiased coin; if heads comes up, Player 1 will play action A and Player 2 will play action C; otherwise, Player 1 will play action B and Player 2 will play action D. The realization induced on the leaves is such that $\rho(\textcircled{1}) = \rho(\textcircled{8}) = 1/2$ and $\rho(i) = 0$ for $i \notin \{1, 8\}$. No behavioral strategy for the team members is able to induce the same realization. This coordination device is enough to overcome the imperfect information of Player 2 about Player 1’s move, as Player 2 knows what action will be played by Player 1 even though Player 2 will not observe it during the game.




Figure 1: Example of extensive-form game with a team. The uppercase letters denote the action names. The circled numbers uniquely identify the terminal nodes.




Figure 2: A game where coordinated strategies have a weak signaling power. The uppercase letters denote the action names. The circled numbers uniquely identify the terminal nodes.

One might wonder whether there is value in forcing the coordination device to only induce normal-form strategies for which a realization-equivalent tuple of behavioral strategies (one for each team member) exists. Indeed, under such a restriction, the problem of constructing an optimal coordination device would amount to finding the optimal tuple of behavioral strategies (one for each team member) that maximizes the team’s utility. This solution concept is known as *team-maxmin equilibrium (TME)* [25]. TME offers conceptual simplicity that unfortunately comes at a high cost. First, finding the best tuple of behavioral strategies is a non-linear, non-convex optimization problem. Moreover, restricting to TMEs is also undesirable in terms of final utility for the team, since it may incur in an arbitrarily large loss compared to a TMECor [6].

Interestingly, as we will prove in Section 4.2, there is a strong connection between TME and TMECor. The latter solution concept can be seen as the natural “convexification” of the former, in a sense that we will make precise in Theorem 2.

4 Realization form: a universal, low-dimensional game representation

In this section, we introduce the *realization form* of a game, which enables one to represent the strategy space of a player by a number of variables that is linear in the game size (as opposed to exponential as in the normal form), even in games with imperfect recall. For each player i , a *realization-form strategy* is a vector that specifies the probability with which i plays to reach the different terminal nodes. The mapping from normal-form strategies to realization-form strategies allows us to compress the action space from \mathcal{X}_i , which has as many coordinates as the number of normal-form plans—usually exponential in the size of the tree—to a space that has one coordinate for each terminal node. This mapping is many-to-one because of the redundancies in the normal-form representation. Given a realization-form strategy, all the normal-form strategies that induce it are payoff equivalent.

The construction of the realization form relies on the following observation.

Observation 1. Let Γ be a game and $z \in Z$ be a terminal node. Given a normal-form strategy profile $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in \mathcal{X}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{X}_n$, the probability of reaching z can be uniquely decomposed as the product of the contributions of each individual player, plus chance’s contribution. Formally, $\rho^x(z) = \rho_c^z \prod_{i \in \mathcal{P}} \rho_i^{x_i}(z)$.

Definition 1 (Realization function). Let Γ be a game. The realization function of player $i \in \mathcal{P}$ is the function $f_i^\Gamma : \mathcal{X}_i \rightarrow [0, 1]^{|Z|}$ that maps every normal-form strategy for player i to the corresponding vector of realizations for each terminal node: $f_i^\Gamma : \mathcal{X}_i \ni x \mapsto (\rho_i^x(z_1), \dots, \rho_i^x(z_{|Z|}))$.

We are interested in the range of f_i^Γ , called the *realization polytope* of player i .

Definition 2 (Realization polytope and strategies). *Player i 's realization polytope Ω_i^Γ in game Γ is the range of f_i^Γ , that is the set of all possible realization vectors for player i : $\Omega_i^\Gamma := f_i^\Gamma(\mathcal{X}_i)$. We call an element $\omega_i \in \Omega_i^\Gamma$ a realization-form strategy (or, simply, realization) of player i .*

The function that maps a tuple of realization-form strategies, one for each player, to the payoff of each player, is multilinear. This is by construction and follows from Observation 1. Moreover, the realization function has the following strong property (all proofs are provided in Appendix B).

Lemma 1. *f_i^Γ is a linear function and Ω_i^Γ is a convex polytope.*

For players with perfect recall, the realization form is the projection of the sequence form, where variables related to non-terminal sequences are dropped. In other words, when the perfect-recall property is satisfied, it is possible to move between the sequence-form and the realization-form representations by means of a simple linear transformation. Therefore, the realization polytope of perfect-recall games can be described with a linear number (in the game size) of linear constraints. Conversely, in games with imperfect recall the number of constraints required to describe the realization polytope may be exponential⁴. A key feature of the realization form is that it can be applied to both settings without any modification. For example, an optimal NE in a two-player zero-sum game, with or without perfect recall and/or information, can be computed through the bilinear saddle-point problem $\max_{\omega_1 \in \Omega_1^\Gamma} \min_{\omega_2 \in \Omega_2^\Gamma} \omega_1^\top U \omega_2$, where U is a (diagonal) $|Z| \times |Z|$ payoff matrix.

Finally, the realization form of a game is formally defined as follows.

Definition 3 (Realization form). *Given an extensive-form game Γ , its realization form is a tuple $(\mathcal{P}, Z, U, \Omega^\Gamma)$, where Ω^Γ specifies a realization polytope for each $i \in \mathcal{P}$.*

4.1 Two examples of realization polytopes

To illustrate the realization-form construction, we consider two three-player zero-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall, where a team composed of two players playing against the third player. As already observed, since the team member have the same incentives, the team as a whole behaves as a single meta-player with (potentially) imperfect recall. As we show in Example 2, ex-ante coordination allows team members to behave as a single player with perfect recall. In contrast, in Example 3, the signaling power of *ex ante* coordinated strategies is not enough to fully reveal private team members' information.

Example 2. *Consider the game depicted in Figure 1. \mathcal{X}_T is the 4-dimensional simplex corresponding to the space of probability distributions over the set of pure normal-form plans $\Sigma_T = \{AC, AD, BC, BD\}$. Given $x \in \mathcal{X}_T$, the probability with which T plays to reach a certain outcome is the sum of every $x(\sigma)$ such that plan $\sigma \in \Sigma_T$ is consistent with the outcome (i.e., the outcome is reachable if T plays σ). In the example, we have:*

$$f_T(x) = (x(A, C), x(A, D), x(B, C), x(B, D), x(A, C), x(A, D), x(B, C), x(B, D)),$$

where outcomes are ordered from left to right in the tree. Then, the realization polytope is described by Polytope 1. These constraints show that Player T has perfect recall when employing coordinated strategies. Indeed, the constraints coincides with the sequence-form constraints obtained when splitting Player 2's information set into two information sets, one for each action $\{A, B\}$.

Example 3. *In the game in Figure 2, the team Player T has imperfect recall even when coordination is allowed. In this case, the signaling power of *ex ante* coordinated strategies is not enough for Player 1 to propagate the information observed (that is, A 's move) to Player 2. It can be verified that the realization polytope Ω_T^Γ is characterized by the set of constraints in Polytope 2 (see Appendix A for more details). As one might expect, this polytope contains Polytope 1.*

4.2 Relationship with team max-min equilibrium

In this subsection we study the relationship with team max-min equilibrium, and prove a fact of potential independent interest. This subsection is not needed for understanding the rest of the paper.

We prove that the realization polytope of a non-absent-minded player is the convex hull of the set of realizations that are reachable starting from behavioral strategies. This gives a precise meaning to our claim that *the TMECor concept is the convexification of the TME concept*.

⁴Understanding in which subclasses of imperfect-recall games the number of constraints remains polynomial is an interesting open problem.

$$\begin{cases} \omega(\textcircled{5}) + \omega(\textcircled{6}) + \omega(\textcircled{7}) + \omega(\textcircled{8}) = 1, \\ \omega(\textcircled{2}) = \omega(\textcircled{6}), \quad \omega(\textcircled{4}) = \omega(\textcircled{8}), \\ \omega(\textcircled{1}) = \omega(\textcircled{5}), \quad \omega(\textcircled{3}) = \omega(\textcircled{7}), \\ \omega(\textcircled{i}) \geq 0 \quad i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8\}. \end{cases}$$

Polytope 1: Description of the realization polytope for the game of Figure 1.

$$\begin{cases} \omega(\textcircled{5}) + \omega(\textcircled{6}) + \omega(\textcircled{7}) + \omega(\textcircled{8}) = 1, \\ \omega(\textcircled{2}) + \omega(\textcircled{4}) = \omega(\textcircled{6}) + \omega(\textcircled{8}), \\ \omega(\textcircled{1}) + \omega(\textcircled{3}) = \omega(\textcircled{5}) + \omega(\textcircled{7}), \\ \omega(\textcircled{i}) \geq 0 \quad i \in \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8\}. \end{cases}$$

Polytope 2: Description of the realization polytope for the game of Figure 2.

Definition 4. Let Γ be a game. The behavioral-realization function of player i is the function $\tilde{f}_i^\Gamma : \Pi_i \ni \pi \mapsto (\rho_i^\pi(z_1), \dots, \rho_i^\pi(z_{|Z|})) \in [0, 1]^{|Z|}$. Accordingly, the behavioral-realization set of player i is the range of \tilde{f}_i^Γ , that is $\tilde{\Omega}_i^\Gamma := \tilde{f}_i^\Gamma(\Pi_i)$. This set is generally non-convex.

Denoting by $\text{co}(\cdot)$ the convex hull of a set, we have the following:

Theorem 2. Consider a game Γ . If player i is not absent-minded, then $\Omega_i^\Gamma = \text{co}(\tilde{\Omega}_i^\Gamma)$.

5 Auxiliary game: an equivalent game that enables the use of behavioral strategies

In the rest of this paper, we focus on three-player zero-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall, and we will model the interaction of a team composed of two players playing against the third player. The theory developed also applies to settings with teams with an arbitrary number of players.

We prove that it is possible to construct an *auxiliary game* with the following properties:

- it is a two-player perfect-recall game between the adversary \mathcal{A} and a *team-player* \mathcal{T} ;
- for both players, the set of behavioral strategies is as “expressive” as the set of the normal-form strategies in the original game (i.e., in the case of the team, the set of strategies that team members can achieve through *ex ante* coordination).

To accomplish this, we introduce a root node ϕ , whose branches correspond to the normal-form strategies of the first player of the team. This representation enables the team to express any probability distribution over the ensuing subtrees, and leads to an equivalence between the behavioral strategies in this new perfect-recall game (the auxiliary game) and the normal-form strategies of the original two-player imperfect-recall game between the team and the opponent. The auxiliary game is a perfect-recall representation of the original imperfect-recall game such that the expressiveness of behavioral (and sequence-form) strategies is increased to match the expressiveness of normal-form strategies in the original game.

Consider a generic Γ with $\mathcal{P} = \{1, 2, \mathcal{A}\}$, where 1 and 2 are team members. We will refer to Player 1 as the *pivot player*. For any $\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1$, we define Γ_{σ_1} as the two-player game with $\mathcal{P} = \{2, \mathcal{A}\}$ that we obtain from Γ by fixing the choices of Player 1 as follows: $\forall I \in \mathcal{I}_1$ and $\forall a \in A(I)$, if $a = \sigma_1(I)$, then $\pi_{1, \sigma_1}(I, a) = 1$; otherwise, $\pi_{1, \sigma_1}(I, a) = 0$. Once π_{1, σ_1} has been fixed in Γ_{σ_1} , decision nodes belonging to Player 1 can be considered as if they were chance nodes. The auxiliary game of Γ , denoted with Γ^* , is defined as follows.

Definition 5 (Auxiliary Game). The auxiliary game Γ^* is a two-player game obtained from Γ in the following way:

- $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{T}, \mathcal{A}\}$;
- the root ϕ is a decision node of Player \mathcal{T} with $A(\phi) = \{a_\sigma\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}$;
- each a_σ is followed by a subtree Γ_σ ;
- \mathcal{A} does not observe the action chosen by \mathcal{T} at ϕ .




Figure 3: Structure of the auxiliary game Γ^* .

By construction, all the decision nodes of any information set of team \mathcal{T} are part of the same subtree Γ_σ . Intuitively, this is because, in the original game, team members jointly pick an action from their joint probability distribution and, therefore, every team member knows what the other member is going to play. The opponent has the same number of information sets both in Γ and Γ^* . This is because she does not observe the choice at ϕ and, therefore, her information sets span across all subtrees Γ_σ . The basic structure of the auxiliary game tree is depicted in Figure 3 (information sets of \mathcal{A} are omitted for clarity). Games with more than two team members can be represented though

a Γ^* which has a number of subtrees equal to the Cartesian product of the normal-form plans of all team members except one.

The next lemma is fundamental to understand the equivalence between behavioral strategies of Γ^* and normal-form strategies of Γ . Intuitively, it justifies the introduction of the root node ϕ , whose branches correspond to the normal-form strategies of the pivot player. This representation enables the team \mathcal{T} to express any convex combination of realizations in the Γ_σ subtrees.

Lemma 3. For any Γ , $\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^\Gamma = \text{co} \left(\bigcup_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma_\sigma} \right)$.

The following theorem follows from Lemma 3 and characterizes the relationship between Γ and Γ^* . It shows that there is a strong connection between the strategies of Player \mathcal{T} in the auxiliary game and the *ex ante* coordinated strategies for the team members in the original game Γ .

Theorem 4. Games Γ and Γ^* are realization-form equivalent in the following sense:

- (i) **Team.** Given any distribution over the actions at the game tree root ϕ (i.e., a choice $\Sigma_1 \ni \sigma \mapsto \lambda_\sigma \geq 0$ such that $\sum_{\sigma} \lambda_\sigma = 1$) and any choice of realizations $\{\omega_\sigma \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma_\sigma}\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}$, we have that $\sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_\sigma \omega_\sigma \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^\Gamma$. The converse is also true: given any $\omega \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^\Gamma$, there exists a choice of $\{\lambda_\sigma\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}$ and realizations $\{\omega_\sigma \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma_\sigma}\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}$ such that $\omega = \sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_\sigma \omega_\sigma$.
- (ii) **Adversary.** The realization polytope of the adversary satisfies $\Omega_{\mathcal{A}}^\Gamma = \Omega_{\mathcal{A}}^{\Gamma^*}$.

The following is then a direct consequence of Theorem 4

Corollary 1. The set of payoffs reachable in Γ coincides with the set of payoffs reachable in Γ^* . Specifically, any strategy $\{\lambda_\sigma\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}$, $\{\omega_\sigma\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}$ over Γ^* is payoff-equivalent to the realization-form strategy $\omega = \sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_\sigma \omega_\sigma$ in Γ .

Remark 1. Since Γ_σ has perfect recall, every realization $\omega_\sigma \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma_\sigma}$ can be induced by \mathcal{T} via behavioral strategies.

The above shows that for every *ex ante* coordinated strategy for the team in Γ , there exists a corresponding (payoff-equivalent) behavioral strategy for \mathcal{T} in Γ^* , and *vice versa*. Hence, due to realization-form equivalence between Γ and Γ^* , finding a TMECor in Γ (employing *ex ante* coordinated normal-form strategies), is equivalent to finding a NE in Γ^* (with behavioral strategies).

6 Fictitious team-play: an anytime algorithm for TMECor

This section introduces an anytime algorithm, *fictitious team-play*, for finding a TMECor. It follows from the previous section that in order to find a TMECor in Γ , it suffices to find a two-player NE in the auxiliary game Γ^* (and vice versa, although we do not use this second direction). Furthermore, since Γ^* is a two-player perfect-recall zero-sum game, the *fictitious play (FP)* algorithm can be applied with its theoretical guarantee of converging to a NE. Fictitious play [2, 19] is an iterative algorithm originally described for normal-form games. It keeps track of average normal-form strategies \bar{x}_i , which are output in the end, and they converge to a NE. At iteration t , player i computes the best response against the opponent's empirical distribution of play up to time $t-1$, that is, $x_i^t = \text{BR}(\bar{x}_{-i}^{t-1})$. Then her average strategy is updated as $\bar{x}_i^t = \frac{t-1}{t} \bar{x}_i^{t-1} + \frac{1}{t} x_i^t$. Conceptually, our fictitious team-play algorithm coincides with FP applied to the auxiliary game Γ^* . However, in order to avoid the exponential size of Γ^* , our fictitious team-play algorithm does not explicitly work on the auxiliary game. Rather, it encodes the best-response problems by means of mixed integer linear programs (MILPs) on the original game Γ .

The main algorithm. The pseudocode of the main algorithm is given as Algorithm 1, where $\text{BR}_{\mathcal{A}}(\cdot)$ and $\text{BR}_{\mathcal{T}}(\cdot)$ are the subroutines for solving the best-response problems.

Our algorithm employs realization-form strategies. This allows for a significantly more intuitive way of performing averaging (Steps 7, 8, 10) than what is done in full-width extensive-form fictitious play [11], which employs behavioral strategies.

Our algorithm maintains an average realization $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}$ for the adversary. Moreover, the $|\Sigma_1|$ -dimensional vector $\bar{\lambda}$ keeps the empirical frequencies of actions at node ϕ in auxiliary game Γ^* (see Figure 3). Finally, $\forall \sigma \in \Sigma_1$, $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma} \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma_\sigma}$ is the average realization of the team in the subtree Γ_σ .

After t iterations of the algorithm, only t pairs of strategies are generated. Hence, an optimized implementation of the algorithm can employ a lazy data structure to keep track of the changes to λ and $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma}$.

Initially (Step 2), the average realization $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}$ of the adversary is set to the realization-form strategy equivalent to a uniform behavioral strategy profile. At each iteration the algorithm first computes a team’s best-response against $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}$. We require that the chosen best response assign probability 1 to one of the available actions (say, a_{σ^t}) at node ϕ . (A pure—that is, non-randomized—best response always exists and, therefore, in particular there always exists at least one best response selecting a single action at the root with probability one.) Then, the average frequencies and team’s realizations are updated on the basis of the observed $(\sigma^t, \omega_{\mathcal{T}}^t)$. Finally, the adversary’s best response $\omega_{\mathcal{A}}^t$ against the updated average strategy of the team is computed, and the empirical distribution of play of the adversary is updated.

The *ex ante* coordinated strategy profile for the team is implicitly represented by the pair $(\bar{\lambda}, \bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma})$. In particular, that pair encodes a coordination device that operates as follows:

- At the beginning of the game, a pure normal-form plan $\tilde{\sigma} \in \Sigma$ is sampled according to the discrete probability distribution encoded by $\bar{\lambda}$. Player 1 will play the game according to the sampled plan.
- Player 2 will play according to any normal-form strategy in $f_2^{-1}(\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\tilde{\sigma}})$, that is, any normal-form strategy whose realization is $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\tilde{\sigma}}$.

The correctness of the algorithm then is a direct consequence of realization-equivalence between Γ and Γ^* , which was shown in Theorem 4. In particular, the strategy of the team converges to a profile that is part of a normal-form NE in the original game Γ .

Best-response subroutines. The problem of finding the adversary’s best response to a pair of strategies of the team, namely $\text{BR}_{\mathcal{A}}(\bar{\lambda}, \{\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma}\}_{\sigma})$, can be efficiently tackled by working on Γ (second point of Theorem 4). In contrast, the problem of computing $\text{BR}_{\mathcal{T}}(\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}})$ is NP-hard [24], and inapproximable [6]. Celli and Gatti [6] propose a MILP formulation to solve the team best-response problem. In Appendix E we propose an alternative MILP formulation in which the number of binary variables is polynomial in Γ and proportional to the number of sequences of the *pivot* player.

In our algorithm, we employ a *meta-oracle* that uses simultaneously, as parallel processes, both subroutines, and stops them as soon as one of the two has found a solution or, in the case a time-limit is reached, it stops both subroutines and it returns the best solution (in terms of team’s utility). This circumvents the need to prove optimality in the MILP, which often takes most of the MILP-solving time, and opens the doors to heuristic MILP-solving techniques. One of the key features of the meta-oracle is that its performances are not impacted by the size of Γ^* , which is never *explicitly* employed in the best-responses computation.

7 Experiments

We conducted experiments on three-player Kuhn poker games and three-player Leduc hold’em poker games. These are standard games in the computational game theory literature, and description of them can be found in Appendix F. Our instances are parametric in the number of ranks in the deck. The instances adopted are listed in Tables 1 and 2, where Kr and Lr denote, respectively, a Kuhn instance with r ranks and a Leduc instance with r ranks (i.e., $3r$ total cards). Table 1 also displays the instances’ dimensions in terms of the number of information sets per player and the number of sequences (i.e., number of information set–action pairs) per player, as well as the payoff dispersion Δ_u —that is, the difference between the maximum and minimum attainable team utility.

Fictitious team-play. We instantiated fictitious team-play with the meta-oracle previously discussed, which returns the best solution found by the MILP oracles within the time limit. We let each best-response formulation run on the Gurobi 8.0 MILP solver, with a time limit of 15 seconds and 5000 maximum iterations. Our algorithm is an anytime algorithm, so it does not require a target accuracy ϵ for ϵ -TMECor to be specified in advance. Table 1 shows the any-

Algorithm 1 Fictitious team-play

```

1: function FICTITIOUSTEAMPLAY( $\Gamma$ )
2:   Initialize  $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}$ 
3:    $\bar{\lambda} \leftarrow (0, \dots, 0)$ ,  $t \leftarrow 1$ 
4:    $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma} \leftarrow (0, \dots, 0) \quad \forall \sigma \in \Sigma_1$ 
5:   while within computational budget do
6:      $(\sigma^t, \omega_{\mathcal{T}}^t) \leftarrow \text{BR}_{\mathcal{T}}(\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}})$ 
7:      $\bar{\lambda} \leftarrow (1 - \frac{1}{t})\bar{\lambda} + \frac{1}{t}\mathbb{1}_{\sigma^t}$ 
8:      $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma^t} \leftarrow (1 - \frac{1}{t})\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma^t} + \frac{1}{t}\omega_{\mathcal{T}}^t$ 
9:      $\omega_{\mathcal{A}}^t \leftarrow \text{BR}_{\mathcal{A}}(\bar{\lambda}, \{\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma}\}_{\sigma})$ 
10:     $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow (1 - \frac{1}{t})\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}} + \frac{1}{t}\omega_{\mathcal{A}}^t$ 
11:     $t \leftarrow t + 1$ 
12:  return  $(\bar{\lambda}, (\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma})_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1})$ 

```

Game	Tree size		Δ_u	Fictitious team-play						HCG	Game	Team Utility		
	Inf.	Seq.		10%	5%	2%	1.5%	1%	0.5%			Adv 1	Adv 2	Adv 3
K3	25	13	6	0s	0s	0s	1s	1s	1s	0s	K3	0.0000	0.0000	0.0003
K4	33	17	6	1s	1s	4s	4s	30s	1m 12s	9s	K4	0.0405	0.0259	-0.0446
K5	41	21	6	1s	2s	44s	1m	4m 15s	8m 57s	1m 58s	K5	0.0434	0.0156	-0.0282
K6	49	25	6	1s	12s	43s	5m 15s	8m 30s	23m 32s	25m 26s	K6	0.0514	0.0271	-0.0253
K7	57	29	6	4s	17s	2m 15s	5m 46s	6m 31s	23m 49s	2h 50m	K7	0.0592	0.0285	-0.0259
L3	457	229	21	15s	1m	14m 05s	30m 40s	1h 34m 30s	> 24h	oom	L3	0.2332	0.2089	0.1475
L4	801	401	21	1s	1m 31s	11m 8s	51m 5s	6h 51m	> 24h	oom	L4	0.1991	0.1419	-0.0223

Table 1: Comparison between the run times of fictitious team-play (for various levels of accuracy) and the hybrid column generation (HCG) algorithm. (*oom*: out of memory.)

Table 2: Values of the average strategy profile for different choices of adversary.

time performance, that is, the time it took to reach an $\alpha\Delta_u$ -TMECor for different accuracies $\alpha \in \{10\%, 5\%, 2\%, 1.5\%, 1\%, 0.5\%\}$. Results in Table 1 assume that the team consists of the first and third mover in the game; the opponent is the second mover. Table 2 shows the value of the average strategy computed by fictitious team-play for different choices of the opponent player. This value corresponds to the expected utility of the team for the average strategy profile $(\bar{\lambda}, \bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T}, \sigma})$ at iteration 1000. In Appendix F.3 we show the minimum cumulative utility that the team is *guaranteed* to achieve, that is $-\text{BR}_{\mathcal{A}}(\bar{\lambda}, \{\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T}, \sigma}\}_{\sigma})$.

Hybrid column generation benchmark. We compared against the hybrid column generation (HCG) algorithm [6], which is the only prior algorithm for this problem. To make the comparison fair, we instantiate HCG with the same meta-oracle discussed in the previous section. We again use Gurobi 8.0 MILP solver to solve the best response problem for the team. However, in the case of HCG, no time limit can be set on Gurobi without invalidating the theoretical convergence guarantee of the algorithm. This is a drawback, as it prevents HCG from running in an *anytime* fashion, despite column generation otherwise being an anytime algorithm. In the Leduc poker instances, HCG exceeded the memory budget (40 GB).

Our experiments show that fictitious team-play scales to significantly larger games than HCG. Interestingly, in almost all the games, the value of the team was non-negative: by colluding, the team was able to achieve victory. Moreover, in Appendix F.4, we show that a TMECor provides to the team a substantial payoff increase over the setting where team members play in behavioral strategies.

8 Conclusions and future research

The study of algorithms for multi-player games is challenging. In this paper, we proposed an algorithm for settings in which a team of players faces an adversary and the team members can exploit only *ex ante* coordination, discussing and agreeing on tactics before the game starts. Our first contribution was the realization form, a novel representation that allows us to represent the strategies of the normal form more concisely. The realization form is also applicable to imperfect-recall games. We used it to derive a two-player perfect-recall auxiliary game that is equivalent to the original game, and provides a theoretically sound way to map the problem of finding an optimal ex-ante-coordinated strategy for the team to a classical well-understood Nash equilibrium-finding problem in a two-player zero-sum perfect-recall game. Our second contribution was the design of the fictitious team-play algorithm, which employs a novel best-response meta-oracle. The anytime algorithm is guaranteed to converge to an equilibrium. Our experiments showed that fictitious team-play is dramatically faster than the prior algorithms for this problem.

In the future, it would be interesting to adapt other popular equilibrium computation techniques from the two-player setting (such as CFR) for our setting, by reasoning over the auxiliary game.

The study of algorithms for team games could shed further light on how to deal with imperfect-recall games, that are receiving increasing attention in the community due to the application of imperfect-recall abstractions to the computation of strategies for large extensive-form games [26, 14, 10, 3, 8, 13].

Acknowledgments. This material is based on work supported by the National Science Foundation under grants IIS-1718457, IIS-1617590, and CCF-1733556, and the ARO under award W911NF-17-1-0082.

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A Example 3 (continued)

Denote by Γ the game depicted in Figure 2. Table 3 shows the value of the realization function, evaluated in each pure normal-form plans of Player \mathcal{T} . Each row is a realization vector, and the realization polytope $\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}$ is the convex hull of all these vectors.

	①	②	③	④	⑤	⑥	⑦	⑧
<i>ACE</i>	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0
<i>ACF</i>	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
<i>ADE</i>	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0
<i>ADF</i>	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
<i>BCE</i>	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
<i>BCF</i>	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0
<i>BDE</i>	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
<i>BDF</i>	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	1

Table 3: Mapping between pure normal-form plans and their images under the realization function.

B Proofs

Lemma 1. f_i^{Γ} is a linear function and Ω_i^{Γ} is a convex polytope.

Proof. We start by proving that f_i is linear. Fix a terminal node $z \in Z$, and define $\Sigma_i^*(z)$ as the subset of pure normal-form plans Σ_i of player i for which there exists at least a choice of pure normal-form plans, one for each of the other players, such that under that choice the game terminates in z . Given a normal-form strategy $x \in \mathcal{X}_i$, the contribution of player i to the probability of the game ending in z is computed as

$$\rho_i^x(z) = \sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_i^*(z)} x_{\sigma},$$

which is linear in x .

Now, we show that Ω_i^{Γ} is a convex polytope. By definition, $\Omega_i^{\Gamma} = f_i(\mathcal{X}_i)$ is the image of a convex polytope under a linear function, and therefore it is a convex polytope itself. \square

Theorem 2. Consider a game Γ . If player i is not absent-minded, then $\Omega_i^{\Gamma} = \text{co}(\tilde{\Omega}_i^{\Gamma})$.

Proof.

(\subseteq) We know as a direct consequence of Lemma 1 that $\Omega_i^{\Gamma} = \text{co}\{f_i(\sigma) : \sigma \in \Sigma_i\}$. Since every pure normal-form plan is also a behavioral strategy, $f_i(\sigma) \in \tilde{\Omega}_i^{\Gamma}$ for all $\sigma \in \Sigma_i$. Hence, $\Omega_i^{\Gamma} = \text{co}\{f_i(\sigma) : \sigma \in \Sigma_i\} \subseteq \text{co}(\tilde{\Omega}_i^{\Gamma})$.

(\supseteq) Finally, we prove that $\Omega_i^{\Gamma} \supseteq \text{co}(\tilde{\Omega}_i^{\Gamma})$. Since Ω_i^{Γ} is convex, it is enough to show that $\Omega_i^{\Gamma} \supseteq \tilde{\Gamma}_i^{\Gamma}$. In other words, it is enough to prove that every behavioral-realization is also a realization in the sense of Definition 2, provided that player i is not absent-minded. This is a well-known fact, and we refer the reader to Theorem 6.11 in the book by Maschler et al. [15].

\square

Lemma 3. For any Γ , $\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma} = \text{co}\left(\bigcup_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma}\right)$.

Proof.

(\supseteq) We start by proving that, for all $\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1$, $\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1} \subseteq \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}$. Indeed, as a direct consequence of Lemma 1,

$$\begin{aligned}\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1} &= \text{co}(\{f_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) : \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2\}) \\ &\subseteq \text{co}(\{f_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}(\sigma'_1, \sigma_2) : \sigma'_1 \in \Sigma_1, \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2\}) \\ &= \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}.\end{aligned}$$

Thus,

$$\bigcup_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1} \subseteq \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}$$

and therefore, using the monotonicity of the convex hull function,

$$\text{co}\left(\bigcup_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1}\right) \subseteq \text{co}(\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}) = \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma},$$

where the last equality holds by convexity of $\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}$ (Lemma 1).

(\subseteq) Take $\omega \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}$; we will show that $\omega \in \text{co}\left(\bigcup_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma}\right)$ by exhibiting a convex combination of points in the polytopes $\{\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma} : \sigma \in \Sigma_1\}$ that equals ω . By definition of realization function (Definition 1), ω is the image of a normal-form strategy $\alpha \in \Delta^{|\Sigma_1 \times \Sigma_2|}$ for the team. Hence, by linearity of the realization function $f_{\mathcal{T}}$ (Lemma 1),

$$\omega = \sum_{\substack{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \\ \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2}} \alpha_{\sigma_1, \sigma_2} f_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2). \quad (1)$$

Now, define

$$\nu_{\sigma_1} := \sum_{\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2} \alpha_{\sigma_1, \sigma_2}$$

for each $\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1$. Clearly, each ν_{σ_1} is non-negative, and the sum of all ν_{σ_1} 's is 1. Hence, from (1) we find that

$$\omega = \sum_{\substack{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 \\ \nu_{\sigma_1} > 0}} \nu_{\sigma_1} \xi_{\sigma_1}, \quad \text{where} \quad \xi_{\sigma_1} := \sum_{\sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2} \frac{\alpha_{\sigma_1, \sigma_2}}{\nu_{\sigma_1}} f_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2).$$

Consequently, if we can show that $\xi_{\sigma_1} \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1}$ for all $\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1 : \nu_{\sigma_1} > 0$, the proof is complete. Note that for all relevant σ_1 , ξ_{σ_1} is a convex combination of points in the set $\{f_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2) : \sigma_2 \in \Sigma_2\} \subseteq \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1}$. Finally, using the fact that $\Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1}$ is convex (Lemma 1), we find $\xi_{\sigma_1} \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma\sigma_1}$, concluding the proof. \square

Corollary 1. *The set of payoffs reachable in Γ coincides with the set of payoffs reachable in Γ^* . Specifically, any strategy $\{\lambda_{\sigma}\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}, \{\omega_{\sigma}\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1}$ over Γ^* is payoff-equivalent to the realization-form strategy $\omega = \sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_{\sigma} \omega_{\sigma}$ in Γ .*

Proof. The payoff for the team in Γ is equal to $\langle \sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_{\sigma} \omega_{\sigma}, y \rangle$, where $y \in \mathbb{R}^{|\cdot|}$ is a generic loss vector.

On the other hand, in Γ^* , \mathcal{A} does not observe the initial move in Γ^* , and therefore the loss vector y remains valid in each Γ_{σ} . Therefore, the team's payoff in Γ^* is $\sum_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_{\sigma} \langle \omega_{\sigma}, y \rangle$. The two payoffs clearly coincide. \square

C Action sampling from Γ^*

Given a strategy profile $(\{\lambda_{\sigma_1}\}_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1}, \{\omega_{\sigma_1}\}_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1})$ over Γ^* , the goal is to draw a joint normal-form plan for the team (for the original game).

Proposition 1. Letting $\omega = \sum_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_{\sigma_1} \omega_{\sigma_1}$ and $\xi_{\omega_{\sigma_1}} \in f^{-1}(\omega_{\sigma_1})$, then

$$\xi_{\omega} \triangleq \sum_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_{\sigma_1} \xi_{\omega_{\sigma_1}} \in f^{-1}(\omega).$$

Proof. $f(\xi_{\omega}) = \sum_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_{\sigma_1} f(\xi_{\omega_{\sigma_1}})$ by linearity. This is equal to $\sum_{\sigma_1 \in \Sigma_1} \lambda_{\sigma_1} \omega_{\sigma_1} = \omega$. \square

The immediate way of sampling a joint normal-form action of Γ from a realization ω over Γ^* is the following. First, compute the set of joint actions required to form a normal-form strategy equivalent to ω (it is enough to adopt a simple greedy algorithm). Then, *recommend* each plan (σ_1, σ_2) with probability $\xi_{\omega}(\sigma_1, \sigma_2)$ since $\xi_{\omega} \triangleq f^{-1}(\omega) \in \Delta^{|\Sigma_1 \times \Sigma_2|}$.

Alternative method. For Lemma 1, the normal-form plan (σ_1, σ_2) is played with probability $\lambda_{\sigma_1} \xi_{\omega_{\sigma_1}}(\sigma_2)$. Therefore, we can first sample an action for Player 1 according to λ_{σ_1} . Then, we are left with the problem of finding $\xi_{\omega_{\sigma_1}} \in f^{-1}(\omega_{\sigma_1})$. It is enough to sample an element from $\mathbf{1}_{\sigma_1} \times \xi_{2, \omega_{\sigma_1}}$, where $\mathbf{1}_{\sigma_1} \in \Delta^{|\Sigma_1|}$ and $\xi_{2, \omega_{\sigma_1}} \in \Delta^{|\Sigma_2|}$.

D TMECor as a hybrid linear programming formulation

This section reviews prior techniques to compute *team-maxmin* equilibria with coordination devices. The leading paradigm to compute a TMECor is the *Hybrid Column Generation* algorithm introduced by Celli and Gatti [6]. This technique makes use of *hybrid* linear programs, which are based on the idea of letting team members play a joint normal-form strategy while the adversary still employs the sequence form. The idea of the algorithm is to proceed in a classical column generation fashion (see, e.g., [16]), generating progressively the set of joint normal-form plans of the team. The rationale is that there exists at least one TMECor with at most $|Q_{\mathcal{A}}|$ joint normal-form plans played with strictly positive probability by the team.

Consider $\mathcal{P} = \{1, 2, \mathcal{A}\}$, where \mathcal{A} denotes the adversary (opponent) of the team. The algorithm progressively adds joint normal-form plans from $\Sigma_1 \times \Sigma_2$ to the set the set $\Sigma_{1 \times 2}^{\text{cur}}$. A hybrid utility matrix U_h is built along with $\Sigma_{1 \times 2}^{\text{cur}}$. For each $\sigma_{1 \times 2} \in \Sigma_{1 \times 2}^{\text{cur}}$ a $Q_{\mathcal{A}}$ -dimensional column vector is added to U_h . At each iteration of the algorithm, a *hybrid-maxmin* and a *hybrid-minmax* are employed to compute the equilibrium strategy profile for the current U_h . The *hybrid-maxmin* problem has $|Q_{\mathcal{A}}| + 1$ constraints and $|\Sigma_{1 \times 2}^{\text{cur}}| + |\mathcal{I}_{\mathcal{A}}|$ variables, the *hybrid-minmax* is obtained by strong duality. Then, a new joint normal-form plan of the team is selected through a best response oracle. These steps are iterated until the oracle returns a best response that is already contained in $\Sigma_{1 \times 2}^{\text{cur}}$.

The problem of finding a joint normal-form plan of the team in best response to a given sequence-form strategy of the opponent is shown to be APX-hard (i.e., it does not admit a PTAS). The oracle of [6] employs a binary variable for each terminal node of the game. It produces two pure sequence-form strategies for the team members by forcing, for each $z \in Z$, the corresponding binary variable to be equal to 1 iff all team's sequences on the path to z are selected with probability 1.

The main concern with this approach is that, with the growth of $\Sigma_{1 \times 2}^{\text{cur}}$, LP's computations easily become an infeasible computational burden as the hybrid representation is exponential in the number of information sets of team members ($2^{|\mathcal{I}_1| + |\mathcal{I}_2|}$).

E Team best-response subroutine

Our subroutine looks for a pair $(\sigma^t, \omega_{\mathcal{T}}^t)$, with $\sigma \in \Sigma_1$, and $\omega_{\mathcal{T}}^t \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma, \sigma}$, in best-response to a given $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}$. In order to compute $(\sigma^t, \omega_{\mathcal{T}}^t)$, we employ the sequence-form strategies of the team defined over Γ . Specifically, the pure sequence-form strategy r_1 corresponds to selecting a $\sigma \in \Sigma_1$ at ϕ in Γ^* . Determining the (potentially mixed) sequence-form strategy for the other team member (r_2) is equivalent to computing $\omega_{\mathcal{T}}^t$ in the subtree selected by r_1 .

Without loss of generality, we assume that all payoffs of the team to be non-negative; indeed, payoffs can always be shifted by a constant without affecting the BR problem. In the following, sequence form constraints (see Section 2) are written, as customary, in matrix form as $F_i r_i = f_i$, where F_i is an appropriate $|H_i| \times |Q_i|$ matrix and $f_i^{\top} = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$ is a vector of dimension $|H_i|$.

The $\text{BR}_{\mathcal{T}}(\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}})$ subroutine consists of the following MILP:

$$\arg \max_{w, r_1, r_2} \sum_{q_1 \in Q_1} w(q_1) \quad (2)$$

$$\text{s.t. } w(q_1) \leq \sum_{q_2 \in Q_2} u_{q_1, q_2}^{\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}} r_2(q_2) \quad \forall q_1 \in Q_1 \quad (3)$$

$$w(q_1) \leq M r_1(q_1) \quad \forall q_1 \in Q_1 \quad (4)$$

$$F_1 r_1 = f_1 \quad (5)$$

$$F_2 r_2 = f_2 \quad (6)$$

$$r_2(q_2) \geq 0 \quad \forall q_2 \in Q_2 \quad (7)$$

$$r_1 \in \{0, 1\}^{|Q_1|} \quad (8)$$

where $u^{\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}}$ is the $|Q_1| \times |Q_2|$ utility matrix of the team obtained by marginalizing with respect to the given realization of the opponent $\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}$. r_1 is a $|Q_1|$ -dimensional vector of binary variables. The formulation can be derived starting from the problem of maximizing $r_1^\top u r_2$ under constraints (5)–(8). Let $a_{q_1} \triangleq \sum_{q_2} u_{q_1, q_2}^{\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{A}}} r_2(q_2)$, and $w(q_1) \triangleq r_1(q_1) a_{q_1}$. Then, the objective function becomes $\sum_{q_1 \in Q_1} w(q_1)$. In order to ensure that, whenever $r_1(q_1) = 0$, $w(q_1) = 0$, the following constraints are necessary: $w(q_1) \leq M r_1(q_1)$ and $w(q_1) \geq 0$, where M is the maximum payoff of the team. Moreover, in order to ensure that $w(q_1) = a_{q_1}$ holds whenever $r_1(q_1) = 1$, we introduce $w(q_1) \leq a_{q_1}$ and $w(q_1) \geq a_{q_1} - M(1 - r_1(q_1))$. It is enough to enforce upper bounds on w 's values (Constraints (3) and (4)) because of the objective function that we are maximizing and since we assume a positive utility for each terminal node.

In settings with more than two team members, our formulation enables one to pick any one team player's strategy and represent it using continuous variables instead of having binary variables for her in the best-response oracle MILP.

F Experimental evaluation

F.1 Kuhn3- k

In Kuhn3- k there are three players and k possible cards. Each player initially pays one chip to the pot, and is dealt a single private card. Then, players act in turns. The first player may check or bet—put one additional chip in the pot. The second player either decides whether to check or bet after first player's check, or whether to fold/call the bet. If no bet was previously made, the third player decides between checking or betting. Otherwise, she has to fold or call. If the second player bet, the first player still has to decide between fold/call. If the third player bet, then both the first and the second have to choose between folding or calling the bet. At the showdown, the player with the highest card who has not folded wins all the chips in the pot.

F.2 Leduc3- k

Leduc hold'em poker [21] is a widely-used benchmark in the imperfect-information game-solving community. In order to better evaluate the scalability of our technique, we employ a larger three-player variant of the game. In our enlarged variant, the deck contains three suits and $k \geq 3$ card ranks, that is, it consists of triples of cards $1, \dots, k$ for a total of $3k$ cards.

Each player initially pays one chip to the pot, and is dealt a single private card. After a first round of betting (with betting parameter $p = 2$, see below), a community card is dealt face up. Then, a second round of betting is played (with betting parameter $p = 4$, see below). Finally, a showdown occurs and players that did not fold reveal their private cards. If a player pairs her card with the community card, she wins the pot. Otherwise, the player with the highest private card wins. In the event that all players have the same private card, they draw and split the pot.

Each round of betting with betting parameter p goes as follows:

- (1) Player 1 can check or bet p . If Player 1 checks, the betting round continues with Step (2); otherwise, the betting round continues with Step (8).

- (2) Player 2 can check or bet p . If Player 2 checks, the betting round continues with Step (3); otherwise, the betting round continues with Step (6).
- (3) Player 3 can check or bet p . If Player 3 checks, the betting round ends; otherwise, the betting round continues with Step (4).
- (4) Player 1 can fold or call. If Player 1 folds, the betting round continues with Step (5); otherwise, Player 1 adds p to the pot and the betting round continues with Step (5).
- (5) Player 2 can fold or call. In either case the betting round ends. If Player 2 calls, she adds p to the pot.
- (6) Player 3 can fold or call. If Player 3 folds, the betting round continues with Step (7); otherwise, Player 3 adds p to the pot and the betting round continues with Step (7).
- (7) Player 1 can fold or call. If Player 1 calls, she adds p to the pot. After Player 1's choice the betting round ends.
- (8) Player 2 can fold or call. If Player 2 folds, the betting round continues with Step (9); otherwise, Player 2 adds p to the pot and the betting round continues with Step (9).
- (9) Player 3 can fold or call. If Player 3 calls, she adds p to the pot. The betting round terminates after her choice.

F.3 Worst case team utility

Table 4 shows the utility that the team is guaranteed to achieve in each game instance, with varying position of the opponent. These values are the worst case utilities, obtained when the opponent is best responding against the average team strategy. Specifically, let $\bar{\omega}'_{\mathcal{T}} \in \Omega_{\mathcal{T}}^{\Gamma}$ be the team realization over Γ induced by the average team strategy $(\bar{\lambda}, (\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma})_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1})$ (computed through Algorithm 1), and let $\omega_{\mathcal{A}}^* = \text{BR}_{\mathcal{A}}(\bar{\lambda}, (\bar{\omega}_{\mathcal{T},\sigma})_{\sigma \in \Sigma_1})$. Then, the values are computed as, $\bar{\omega}'_{\mathcal{T}}{}^{\top} U \omega_{\mathcal{A}}^*$, where U is a suitably defined (diagonal) $|Z| \times |Z|$ payoff matrix.

Game	Team Utility		
	Adv 1	Adv 2	Adv 3
K3	-0.0002	-0.0002	-0.0001
K4	0.0369	0.0215	-0.0474
K5	0.0405	0.0137	-0.0274
K6	0.0499	0.0262	-0.0267
K7	0.0569	0.0271	-0.0254
L3	0.1533	0.0529	-0.0412
L4	0.0829	-0.029	-0.1901

Table 4: Worst case utilities for the team.

F.4 Comparison between *ex ante* coordinated strategies and behavioral strategies

The results obtained on parametric Kuhn game instances with fictitious team-play are compared with the results obtained by computing the *team-maxmin* equilibrium [25], which is the best NE attainable without *ex ante* coordination of team members.

We employ fictitious team-play with 5000 iterations and a time limit of 15 seconds on the oracles' compute times (see also Table 2). A team-maxmin equilibrium is computed by solving a non-linear, non-convex optimization problem [6]. We employ AMPL 20181005, with the global optimization solver BARON 18.8.23 [22], and we set a time threshold of 15 hours.

Table 5 describes the results obtained in games where the opponent plays as the second player. Column *team-maxmin* displays the utility obtained when the opponent best-responds to the incumbent team strategies computed by the solver (BARON never reaches an optimal solution within the time limit).

Game	team-maxmin	TMECor
K3	$-6.03 \cdot 10^{-8}$	0.0004
K4	0.0237	0.0335
K5	0.0116	0.0205
K6	0.0207	0.0329
K7	0.0198	0.0333

Table 5: Comparison between the utility of the team at the *team-maxmin* equilibrium and at the TMECor.

Ex ante coordination always makes team members better off with respect to playing behavioral strategies.